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Abstract   This paper compares the economic incentives created by transferable
and non-transferable quotas in a fishery, in particular the incentives to discard
fish of certain species or grades when quotas are enforced at the landing site.
With a hypothetical efficient allocation of non-transferable quotas, the incentive
structure is essentially the same as under transferable quotas. However, in the
absence of the information provided by the quota price, outcomes may not be
the same under all conditions. Inefficient allocations of non-transferable quotas
will tend to reduce discards due to highgrading but increase discards in
multispecies fisheries. The impact of discarding on the quota price in a transfer-
able quota fishery is examined.
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Introduction
Quota management is widely employed in fisheries in order to achieve conservation
and (in some cases at least) efficiency objectives. Although much attention in recent
years has focused on the market allocation of quotas, in particular on systems of in-
dividual transferable quotas (ITQs), in many countries quotas continue to be
allocated wholly or partially by other means.1 Despite the efficiency arguments for
transferable quotas (e.g., Arnason 1990, Clark 1990), faced with the possible transi-
tion from an existing non-market allocation of quota to a market-based system,
management authorities may be as concerned with the consequences for the enforce-
ment of landings and for levels of discards as with the allocative efficiency of the
fishery. 2
The aim of this paper is to analyse and compare the incentives created by trans-
ferable and non-transferable quotas, in particular the incentives to remain within
quota limits by discarding elements of the catch prior to landing. The role of en-
forcement in assuring that quotas are respected at the landing site is explicitly
considered. Clearly, both over-quota landings and discards are of serious concern for
the management authority, since a total allowable catch (TAC) which appears to
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have been complied with may, in reality, have been exceeded by a significant (and
unknown) margin.
The basic economics of discarding in fisheries are examined by Anderson
(1994a, 1994b) and Arnason (1994). Both Anderson (1994a) and Arnason (1994)
emphasise that the necessary condition for discarding is that there is some differen-
tiation in the catch and the sufficient condition is then that the unit costs of retaining
and landing a part of the catch exceed the corresponding market price. Arnason
(1994) finds that, to the extent that an ITQ system introduces an (additional) oppor-
tunity cost for each unit of fish landed (the quota price), all else equal, incentives to
discard are increased under ITQs compared to a free-access fishery.3 Anderson (1994b)
compares incentives to discard particular grades of fish with a capacity (hold) constraint
and with ITQs, noting the theoretical equivalence of the shadow price on the physical
constraint and the ITQ price.4 Similarly, Vestergaard (1996) compares such highgrading
incentives under non-transferable quotas and ITQs, concluding that, all else equal, dis-
cards will increase (decrease) under ITQs if the quota price is greater (smaller) than the
shadow price of the non-transferable quota. All these studies, though, confine them-
selves to cases where there are just two elements to the catch. Further, the discard
incentives which arise in multispecies quota fisheries due to quota/catch mismatches at
the vessel level (e.g., Squires 1987, Kirkley and Strand 1988, Squires et al. 1998) have
not been studied in any detail. Experience suggests, however, that in multispecies
fisheries, managers (and indeed fishermen) are greatly concerned about discards due
to vessels not holding quota in the same proportions as species appear in the catch.
This paper extends analysis of the microeconomics of quota management in or-
der to gain greater insight into potential outcomes under non-transferable and
transferable quota regimes, including the implications of discarding for the quota
price in a transferable quota fishery. The paper is structured as follows. The next
section develops a simple short-run model of vessel behaviour with an output
(quota) constraint, which is then allowed to be transferable. The third section exam-
ines incentives for discarding in a multispecies fishery with transferable and
non-transferable quotas, while the following section considers highgrading; i.e., dis-
carding in a single-species fishery in which there are many grades of the same
species. A final section contains some concluding comments.
The Basic Quota Model
Consider a fishing vessel operated as a single price-taking firm. To begin with, as-
sume a single-species fishery with no price differentiation between any elements of
the catch. In a given period, the firm’s short-run profit function is:
p(q) º pq - c(q),
where q is the catch and p is the unit price received for the catch at first sale (fish
prices are assumed parametric to the firm and the fishery throughout).5 Variable
costs, c, are defined as a function of catch. It is assumed, implicitly in the profit
function, that catch is a deterministic function of an unspecified variable input
3 This was, more or less, the result for individual quotas suggested by Copes (1976).
4 In the single species case only, a hold constraint is analogous to a non-transferable quota that is per-
fectly enforced.
5 For clarity, individual firm subscripts are omitted throughout.Quota Management in Fisheries 79
(which we could call effort) and for simplicity can be treated as the choice variable.
We assume increasing marginal costs of effort, and therefore catch; i.e., c²(q) > 0, so
that there is some finite level of catch at which short-run profits are maximised.
Given this, the necessary condition for (unconstrained) profit maximisation is, as is
usual, dp/dq º p – c¢(q) = 0.




 pq - c(q)   s.t. q £ Q.
The corresponding Lagrangian:
 L = pq - c(q) - l q - Q [ ]
yields the first order (Kuhn-Tucker) condition for profit maximisation:
p - ¢ c (q) = l. (1)
Assuming the constraint binds, the Lagrange multiplier l represents the shadow
price of the quota; i.e., l = ¶p/¶Q, which equates with marginal profit [p – c¢(q)] at
the quota constraint. If equation (1) is rearranged as p – l = c¢(q), the LHS term (p – l)
can be thought of as the virtual price of constrained output (following Neary and
Roberts 1980); i.e., the output price at which the firm would choose freely to pro-
duce at q* = Q. In essence, the fundamental short-run goal of a quota management
system is to induce vessels to produce as if they faced an output price of (p – l)
rather than p at some appropriate level of output. As we will see, the shadow price
can be imposed as an actual or expected cost through a system of penalties or, in the
case of transferable quotas, the market price for quota. In this respect, management
by quotas is theoretically similar to the use of a tax to control output.6
In a real world fishery, some (or many) vessels will seek to catch more than the
quota if it is profitable to do so (indeed all will if we assume strictly rational
behaviour; i.e., behaviour motivated solely by monetary costs and benefits). The
fishery management authority is then faced with the task of enforcing compliance
with quotas by imposing a penalty on vessels which violate. A monitoring system
must detect infringements, and the judicial system must then impose penalties of an
appropriate size. Let the resultant expected fine for a violation q > Q be F(q) with
F²(q) ³ 0.7 Now (for a risk-neutral firm) expected profits are maximised where:
6 Clark (1985) makes a similar point in the context of ITQs, as does Boyce (1996). The distinctions pri-
marily concern the distribution of short-run profits. With an output tax, a management authority receives
part of the revenue on every unit of production. With transferable quotas there is an opportunity cost for
every unit of quota used, part of which might be paid to the management authority if there is a quota or
revenue charge as a means of rent capture (e.g., Grafton 1995). With a perfectly enforced non-transfer-
able quota, however, all profit from production up to the quota limit is retained by the firm.
7 The modeling of enforcement here derives from the utilitarian approach of Becker (1968); see Sutinen and
Andersen (1985); Anderson and Lee (1986); and Charles, Mazany, and Cross (1999) for fisheries applica-
tions. The expected fine F(·) depends upon the probability of detection and sanction and the anticipated pen-
alty if sanctioned. In practice, the management authority may face difficulties including political or judicial
resistance to the imposition of larger financial penalties for fishing offences as well as the costs and decreas-
ing marginal returns of increasing enforcement effort and the probability of detecting offences. See, for ex-
ample, Sutinen and Andersen (1985), Anderson and Lee (1986), Milliman (1986), and Anderson (1989).Hatcher 80
p- ¢ c (q)= ¢ F (q). (2)
Note that F¢(q), the expected marginal fine as a function of catch, neatly replaces the
l in equation (1). Effective enforcement of the quota; i.e., production at q* = Q, re-
quires that the expected marginal fine for the first unit of violation is at least as
large as the shadow price, l (and is non-decreasing for further units of violation).8
Now let quotas be transferable. In the short run, the firm can vary its quota allo-




pq - c(q) - rQ  s.t. q £ Q,
where r is the short-run (rental) price of quota. The first-order conditions for q*, Q* > 0
are equation (1) together with r = l. Solving for l, we have the standard decision
rule for transferable quotas:
p - ¢ c (q) = r, (3)
which, as we see, implicitly assumes that r is equated with l. The most important
implication of a transferable quota from the individual firm’s short-run decision-
making perspective is that there is now a choice between landing a marginal unit of
fish illegally or purchasing an additional unit of quota. It is apparent, however, that
a strictly rational firm will only buy quota if it is less costly than the expected fine
incurred if the fish was landed without quota. In other words, for equation (3) to
hold in practice requires that enforcement is such that the expected marginal fine for
landing over-quota fish is always equal to or greater than l.10 We will make this as-
sumption from now on, but it should be remembered that incentives for discarding
are contingent upon the enforcement of landings controls.
Quotas and Discarding in a Multispecies Fishery
Now consider a vessel firm in a multispecies fishery. Let there be m species in the
fishery (indexed i = 1,2,…m), which are always caught in the same proportion; i.e.,
there is no random variation in the catch composition, nor can the vessel selectively
target particular species or otherwise alter the catch composition.11 Let bi be the pro-
portion of the ith species in the catch, so that  i=1
m å bi =1 and  q = i=1
m å biq , and let
there be m associated quotas Q1, Q2,…Qm. As before, assume that each species is an
8 The requirement for F²(·) ³ 0 is effectively a statement of the legal principal of marginal (and cumula-
tive) deterrence (Shavell 1992).
9 It is assumed that the vessel has no initial endowment of quota. Given that in the quota market unused
quota has an opportunity cost equal to the price at which quota must be bought, this does not affect the
results obtained. This would not be true, however, in the case where one or more firms enjoys market
power in the quota market (see Anderson 1991).
10 As Malik (1990) and Keeler (1991) discuss in the context of tradeable pollution permits, given certain
assumptions about the form of the expected penalty function, if all vessels in the fishery behaved strictly
rationally, a quota price greater than the expected marginal fine at the optimum level of catch would not
be observed since the market price for quota would then simply fall to the level of the expected marginal
fine. We would then have the same decision rule whether vessels in the fishery are compliant or not.
11 The restrictiveness of this assumption, and the possible implications of relaxing it, are discussed later.Quota Management in Fisheries 81
undifferentiated product and commands a constant market price pi. We now assume
(as is most often the case in practice) that catches cannot be observed by the author-
ity but landings can. The quota constraints, therefore, have to be formulated in terms
of landings rather than catches. This introduces an additional set of choice variables:
the level of discards of each species. The quota constraint for the ith species be-
comes biq – di £ Qi, where di is the quantity of the catch of that species which is
discarded prior to landing.12
Non-transferable Quotas




å pi biq - di [ ] - c(q) s.t. biq - di £ Qi and di £ biq,
where the second constraint ensures that the vessel cannot discard more of the ith
species than it catches. Letting mi be the Lagrange multiplier on the ith such discard-










å l ibi (4)
and
pi + mi = l i, i = 1,2,¼ , m. (5)
The Lagrange function and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimal solution are
shown in full in Appendix A (equations A-1). Note, firstly, that for any species for
which the vessel has a non-zero quota allocation, the multiplier mi is zero (since
there will never be a situation in which all individuals of that species will be dis-
carded); secondly, that the discarding condition (5) cannot hold until and unless a
species quota is filled and the multiplier li becomes positive. Given this, if at the
optimum level of catch the discard condition (5) holds for k of the m species in the
catch, then for the marginal unit of catch we can write:
i=k+ 1
m




where we have first multiplied both sides of equation (5) by bi and then subtracted k
of these conditions from equation (4). Equation (6) states that, at the optimum level
of catch, the marginal profit from the last unit of catch, less the market value of that
12 For simplicity, it is assumed that the process of discarding (and indeed the process of landing fish) is a
costless activity. This does not substantially affect the results, but it does reduce the complexity of the
equations throughout. Note that if landings costs equaled the costs of discarding, these costs would can-
cel out in any case.Hatcher 82
part of the marginal unit of catch which is discarded (i.e., all fish of species
1,2,…k), equals the shadow price of quota for those m – k species which are not dis-
carded (this will be zero with respect to those species quotas which are unfilled). If
we assume that the expected marginal fine for landing over-quota fish is everywhere
equal to (or exceeds) the shadow price of quota, then equation (6) will hold in prac-
tice, and all quotas will be complied with at the point of landing.
If quotas are allocated to the vessel in exactly the same proportion as the spe-
cies appear in the catch, then all quotas will be filled at the same level of catch. If
the expected marginal fine for the first unit of a violation is high enough to equal or
exceed the shadow price at the point where all quotas are just filled, we will have
compliance. Clearly, increasing the catch further cannot be profitable, since the re-
tention of additional fish of any species would increase the expected fine more than
profits. Under these conditions there will be no discarding because of quotas.
If quotas are allocated in different proportions to those in which species appear
in the catch, then the quotas will be filled sequentially at different levels of catch.13
For the ith species quota filled, the discard condition (5) will hold in practice if pi is
equaled (or exceeded) by the expected marginal increase in the fine from retaining
and landing an additional unit of that species (or, equivalently, the expected mar-
ginal reduction in the fine from discarding a unit of that species). Note that here the
shadow price of the quota, li (and hence the expected marginal fine) is simply
equated with pi, and the marginal cost of effort/catch is not involved in the decision
to discard. The catch is increased further, but with fish of the ith species being dis-
carded, until condition (6) holds, as described above. How many species discarded
from the marginal unit of catch at the optimum will depend on the size of quotas in
relation to the vessel’s capacity, the composition of the catch, and the relative mar-
ket price of each species. Note that if, at the optimum, it is not profitable to increase
the catch further in order to fill any remaining unfilled quotas, the RHS of equation
(6) will be equal to zero.
Figure 1 illustrates the simplest two-species case. The curve MP1+2 traces out
the firm’s marginal profit as a function of catch with both species 1 and species 2
retained. The MP2 curve is the marginal profit with only fish of species 2 retained. The
quota for species 1 is filled at a catch level of q0. With perfect enforcement of landings,
catch is increased along the path abcd (discarding fish of species 1) with the quota
for species 2 filled at catch q*. Short-run profits are given by the area 0abcde.
Transferable Quotas
In a multispecies transferable quota fishery, the firm’s profit maximisation problem is:
max
q,d i ,Qi i=1
m
å pi biq - di [ ] - c(q) -
i =1
m
å riQi s.t. biq - di £ Qi and di £ biq,
where ri is the short-run price of quota Qi for the ith species. From the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions shown in Appendix A (equations A-2), we now have three first-order con-
ditions (for  q*,di
*,Qi
* > 0 ) which are, respectively, equations (4) and (5), together
with:
13 Boyce (1996) recognises this problem in the context of TACs for a target species and a bycatch spe-
cies but does not allow for either discarding or cheating in his model.Quota Management in Fisheries 83
ri = li,   i = 1,2, ¼, m. (7)
From equations (4) and (7), and assuming no discarding, we have the decision rule:
i= 1
m





m å r ibi is the price of quota for the marginal unit of catch. Solving equations
(5) and (7) for li, the condition for discarding is:
pi + mi = ri, i = 1,2,...m, (9)
that is, the market price for fish of a given species is just equal to (or less than) the quota
price. Note that, as before, the mi will be zero unless the discard constraints bind.
With active trading in quota, a quota price greater than the selling price of the
fish is rather unlikely. Nevertheless, if for some reason the quota price were greater
than the fish market price for k species in the catch, these species would be dis-
carded from each and every unit of catch, and quota would only be purchased to
cover the catches of the m – k species which are retained and landed. If we multiply
equation (9) by bi and subtract k of these equations from (4), at the same time sub-
stituting ri for li, we have:
i=k+ 1
m
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where the mi are zero for the m – k retained species and are, therefore, dropped.
Equation (10) simply states that at the optimum level of catch, the profit from the
marginal unit of catch (less the value of the discarded part of the catch) equals the
price of quota for the retained part of the catch.
Figure 2 illustrates this for the two-species case. With the market price for spe-
cies 1 (p1) less than the corresponding quota price (r1), all fish of species 1 are
discarded. The optimal level of catch q* is then where the cost of quota for the re-
tained species (r2b2) is just equaled by the marginal profit from the retained catch
MP2. The optimal quota demand is equivalent to Q2
* , and short-run profits are given
by the area abc.14
Transferable and Non-transferable Quotas Compared
In a transferable quota fishery, a vessel can only produce according to equation (8)
if the total species quotas available to the fishery as a whole occur in exactly the
same proportions as the species appear in the catch. Otherwise, at the equilibrium
(efficient) quota allocation, condition (8) cannot possibly hold for every vessel in
the fishery. Letting Wi be the total quota or TAC for the ith species, if we have, say,
W1/ Wi i = 1
m å <b 1 , then at least some vessels will be unable to obtain sufficient quota








14 Note that we cannot infer the quota price for species 2 (r2) directly from the marginal profit curves.
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i.e., according to condition (10). In this case, however, not all fish of species 1 will
be discarded, only those for which the vessel is unable to obtain quota. In effect, we
now have condition (6) for the optimal catch with non-transferable quotas, except
that the ri replace the li for the i = 2,…m species quotas which are relatively uncon-
strained in their supply.15
If the TACs are not set in proportion to the occurrence of species in the catch,
we can find that discarding may be the same, or may be increased, under a system of
non-transferable quotas, depending on how far the allocation of quota differs from
the efficient allocation we would expect under transferable quotas. To see this, let
Q1
* = q*b1  be a vessel’s optimal demand for quota for species 1 (at the optimum
catch q*) when quotas are transferable. Now let the TAC for species 1 be constrained
relative to the other species’ TACs in the fishery, so that the vessel is only able to
obtain  
% Q1 <Q1
*  units of quota for this species.16 At the efficient quota allocation
(which, as argued below, implies the same optimum catch as when the TAC for spe-
cies 1 is not constrained), there will then be  Q1
* - % Q1  discards of fish of species 1.
Suppose that we have a non-transferable quota allocation which mirrors the efficient
allocation, except that the allocation of Q1 to two similar vessels deviates from  
% Q1
by no more than  ±[Q 1
*- ˜  Q  1] units. The total volume of discards of species 1 would
then be unaltered across the two vessels. If, however, the allocation of Q1 deviated
from  
% Q1  by more than this, the total volume of discards of species 1 would be in-
creased. Not only this, there could also be increased discards of other species.
Consider where one vessel is allocated  Q  1 > Q1
* units of quota for species 1, so that
total discards of species 1 across both vessels are increased by  [Q  1 -Q1
* ] units. If it
were profitable for the vessel now to increase its catch by [Q  1 -Q1
* ]/b1 units in order
to  fill  the  extra  quota  it  has  for  species  1,  it  would  need  to  discard
[ Q  1 -Q1
* ]/b1 ×[1-b 1 ]  units of fish of the other species.
Discarding and the Quota Price
In a transferable quota fishery, the undersupply of one species’ TAC relative to the
TACs of other species will have an impact on the quota price for those other species.
If, at the optimum, condition (10) holds, then assuming that the market for all quota
has cleared, we must have the same optimal catch as when the optimum condition is
equation (8) (the absolute quantities of the other species TACs, we have assumed,
are unchanged). Since this implies the same marginal cost for the vessel, we can












å r  ibi,
where the  r  i, i = 2,3,…,m are the quota prices at the optimum when Q1 is under- -
supplied. If we rearrange this to:
15 With a relative undersupply of quota for species 1, it might be argued that the quota price for this
species would then be bid up. At the limit, however, if r1 = p1 the individual vessel would be indifferent
between discarding and not discarding fish of species 1 and would ignore r1 in its production decision.
The effect, in any case, is that Q1 becomes fixed at less than the optimal demand  Q1
*.
16 Assume that the other TACs are unchanged in nominal terms (although, of course, their proportions in






å r  ibi = p1b1 - r1b1, (11)
then provided p1 > r1 when Q1 is not under-supplied, we must have:
i=2
m
å r ibi >
i=2
m
å r  ibi,
i.e., the quota prices for species i = 2,3,…m are reduced due to the constrained sup-
ply of quota for species 1.17 This is not surprising, since the unit costs of catching
and landing fish of these other species are effectively increased.
“Highgrading” within Species Quotas
The problem of a species quota where different grades of fish of the same species
(different sizes, most commonly) command different market prices, appears in the
one-species case structurally similar to the multispecies problem, except that the
quota constraint is expressed as  j=1
n å [bjq-dj]£Q , where subscript j indexes the
grade of fish (j = 1,2,…n). As in the multispecies case, we assume that the vessel
cannot select the catch composition.
Non-transferable Quotas
With a non-transferable species quota, the firm’s maximisation problem is:
max
q,d j j =1
n
å pj b jq - d j [ ] - c(q) s.t.
j=1
n
å b jq - d j [ ] £ Q and d j £ b jq.
From equations (A-3) in Appendix A, the first-order conditions for  q*,dj
* > 0  are:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) +
j=1
n
å m jb j = l (12)
and
pj + m j = l, j = 1,2,...n. (13)
Once the quota is filled, assuming the expected marginal fine for a first unit of a
violation is high enough to deter any over-quota landings (i.e., is at least equal to l),
the discard condition (13) will determine whether a unit of the least valuable fish
17 This includes the possibility that one or more of the ri fall to zero as vessels no longer find it profit-
able to catch the TAC.Quota Management in Fisheries 87
already caught and retained will be discarded to allow a marginal increase in the
catch. Clearly, as Anderson (1994b) notes for the two-grade case in the analogous
setting of a hold constraint, it will only be profitable to do this if the marginal profit
earned from the additional unit of catch is greater than the market price of the fish
discarded. We examine this in more detail as follows. If a unit of fish of grade 1 is
discarded at the optimum level of catch, we can solve for l and rearrange to give:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) = p1 + 1 - b1 [ ]m1, (14)
recalling that the mj are zero for the j = 2,3,…n grades which are not discarded. Note
that the multiplier m1 on the discarding constraint for grade 1 represents the marginal
value, at the optimum, of relaxing the constraint so that an additional unit of fish of
this grade can be discarded (and hence, implicitly, allowing a further marginal in-
crease in catch). Given this, the appearance of the [1 – b1] term on the RHS of
equation (14) requires some explanation. In the objective function, the discarding
constraint on grade 1 must apply to all fish of grade 1 at the optimum; i.e., including




å pjbj - ¢  c (q) + p1b1 = p1 + 1 - b1 [ ]m1
and hence, with some rearranging,
1
1 - b 1 [ ] j=2
n









= p1 + m1. (15)
Equation (15) is equivalent to Anderson’s (1994b) highgrading equation for a
hold constraint, except that here we have generalised from the two-grade case and
assumed the costs of discarding to be zero. We can infer from equation (15) that if
the vessel sought at the margin to replace a unit of fish of grade 1 entirely with fish
of other grades, it would have to expand its catch not by 1 unit but by 1/[1 – b1]
units. Since we have assumed that the vessel does not discard the marginal catch b1
of grade 1, in equation (14) the multiplier m1 is divided by 1/[1 – b1]. Looking at it
another way, at the margin the vessel has a net revenue loss of just [1 – b1]p1 and,
therefore, the associated multiplier is reduced to [1 – b1]m1.
Equation (14) states that if, at the quota-filling level of catch, we have p1 < l, it
is optimal to discard units of this grade and increase the catch further until the mar-
ginal profit from the last unit of catch just equals the market price of the least
valuable grade in the hold, which here is p1, plus the associated m1 term, if positive.
If at this point not all fish of grade 1 have been discarded, then m1 = 0 and hence:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) = p1,Hatcher 88
as we would expect. If, however, all retained fish of grade 1 have been discarded at
the optimum, then m1 > 0 which implies:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) > p1.
Here, there are no fish left to discard that have a market value less than the addi-
tional profit that could be earned from a marginal increase in the catch.18
Figure 3 illustrates the simple case of two grades of fish. The vessel’s quota is
filled at catch q0. Fish of grade 1 are then discarded and the catch is increased to q*
at which point all fish of grade 1 have been discarded (except for those in the mar-
ginal unit of catch). This is the optimal level of catch and profits are 0abc (plus the
value of the grade 1 fish in the marginal unit of catch). The vertical distance from
the grade 1 price line (p1) to the curve MP1+2 (arrowed) is equal to [1 – b1]m1. In the
case of more than one grade of fish discarded, the analysis is less straightforward. In
particular, whereas it might appear intuitively rational always to discard the least
valuable grade first, this may not represent an optimal behaviour. This is discussed
below, where we compare outcomes with transferable and non-transferable quotas.
Transferable Quotas
In the one-species quota case, the firm’s maximisation problem with transferable
quotas is:
max
q, d j , Q
j=1
n
å pj b jq - dj [ ] - c(q) - rQ s.t.
j =1
n
å b jq - dj [ ] £ Q and d j £ b jq.
From equations (A-4) in Appendix A, the first-order conditions for  q*,dj
*,Q* > 0  are
equations (12) and (13) together with:
r = l. (16)
Assuming that the expected marginal fine for a violation is high enough to deter
over-quota landings, the condition for discarding is:
pj + m j = r, j = 1,2,...n, (17)
i.e., the market price for fish of a given grade is just equal to (or less than) the quota
price. Where there is a wide disparity between the market prices received for fish of
different grades, this is quite possible. If the discard condition holds for k grades in
18 Note that with multiple species non-transferable quotas (and no price differentiation between grades),
optimality required only that fish from the marginal unit(s) of catch were discarded. Optimality in this
case, however (assuming that the discarding condition holds), requires that units of the least valuable
grade of fish already retained on board are discarded. It is not difficult to see that the foregoing analysis
generalises straightforwardly to the case of a non-transferable multispecies quota; i.e., a quota covering
more than one species of fish, where, as is most often the case, different species command different mar-
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the catch, then these fish will be discarded from each and every unit of catch. Sub-
stituting r for l in equation (12), then multiplying both sides of equation (13) by bj
and subtracting k of these conditions from equation (12), we have:
j=k+ 1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) =
j= k+1
n
å rb j (18)
for the marginal unit of catch at the optimum (again recalling that the mj for the n – k
grades retained must be zero). The profit from the marginal unit of catch (given the
discarding of k grades from the catch) just equals the cost of quota for that part of
the marginal unit of catch that is retained.
The two-grade example is illustrated by figure 4. With the price of fish of grade
1 (p1) less than the quota price (r), all fish of this grade are discarded, and the catch
is increased to q* where the cost of quota for the retained grade is just equaled by
the marginal profit from the catch with only this grade retained. The optimal quota
demand is equivalent to Q* and profits are given by the area abc.19
Transferable and Non-transferable Quotas Compared
Vestergaard (1996) notes that the extent of highgrading with transferable and non-
transferable quotas depends on the shadow price of the non-transferable quota
compared to the transferable quota price. It can be shown (see Appendix B) that
given a non-transferable quota allocation that is exactly equal to the optimal quota
Figure 3.  Non-transferable Quota with Two Grades of Fish
19 As before, in the diagram we cannot directly infer the quota price, r, from the marginal profit curves.Hatcher 90
demand of a similar vessel under transferable quotas, the shadow price of the non-
transferable quota is equal to the transferable quota price. If, from equation (13), we
then have p1 + m1 = l, the optimal catch and the optimal level of discards of grade 1
are the same. Here, all fish of grade 1 are discarded, so that m1 > 0.
Looking again at figure 4, if the vessel has a non-transferable quota equal to Q*
it will discard all fish of grade 1 and increase the catch to q* at which point there are
no more fish of grade 1 left to discard. Note that with a non-transferable quota, prof-
its are increased by the area 0cbd. Note also that the vertical distance from the
marginal profit curve MP1+2 to the quota price line r (arrowed) must equal b1m1.
Suppose, now, that we have an allocation of non-transferable quotas that is inef-
ficient; i.e., one that differs from the equilibrium allocation under transferable
quotas. Consider a non-transferable quota allocation to a vessel which deviates from
the efficient allocation by plus or minus  
% Q  units. In the case of p1 + m1 = l = r, the
vessel’s optimal catch would then be expected to alter by  ± % Q / j=2
n å bj . Taking two
similar vessels, a reallocation of quota between the two vessels away from an effi-
cient allocation should leave the total volume of discards unchanged. However, if at
the efficient non-transferable quota allocation the value of m1 is close to zero, then
we can envisage a  
% Q  such that the catch could reduce by  
% Q / j=2
n å b j  but not increase
by  ˜  Q / j=2
n å b j, since given p1 it would not be profitable to discard  
% Q / j=2
n å bj  more
fish even with an increase in the quota allocation (if m1 is close to zero, then mar-
ginal profit is nearly equal to p1 at this point). Such a non-transferable quota
allocation, although inefficient, will result in a reduction in the total discards due to
highgrading. The same result will hold wherever the reallocation of quota away
from the efficient allocation increases the number of vessels for which it is physi-
cally possible (though not profitable) to discard beyond the point at which m1 = 0. In
this case, the more inefficient the quota allocation, the greater the overall reduction
in discards due to highgrading.
Our conclusions about highgrading with transferable and non-transferable quo-
Figure 4.  Transferable Quota with Two Grades of FishQuota Management in Fisheries 91
tas were relatively straightforward to derive in the “well-behaved” case where just
one grade of fish is discarded. However, generalising to the case of at least two
grades where it is profitable to discard can present difficulties. To see the problem,
let p1 and p2 be lower than the equilibrium quota price established under transferable
quotas. Given a non-transferable quota allocation of Q* (the same as the efficient al-
location) a rational vessel operator will likely first discard all fish of the
lowest-priced grade 1, increasing the catch to Q*/[1 – b1], before discarding any fish
of the slightly more valuable grade 2. Suppose at this point marginal profit is equal
to p2 (which is possible if both p2 and b1 are relatively high). It will not now be prof-
itable at the margin to discard any fish of grade 2, although if the vessel did so and
increased the total catch to  Q */ j = 3
n å bj, which is the profit-maximising level of
catch under transferable quotas, its total profits would increase. If the vessel could
perceive this at the outset, it would discard grades 1 and 2 together, although it al-
ways appears rational at the margin to discard the lowest-priced grade first. The
firm’s problem, of course, is that with a non-transferable quota it lacks the incentive
signals which under transferable quotas are transmitted via the quota price.
Figure 5 illustrates this graphically for three grades, of which grades 1 and 2
command market prices less than the quota price r. With a non-transferable quota
equal to the optimal transferable quota demand Q*, if the vessel begins to discard
only fish of grade 1, it will increase the catch to a level q0. In order to increase the
catch further to the optimum q*, it would now have to start discarding fish of grade
2, but it will not do this because marginal profit is equal to p2 at this point. Instead
of potential short-run profits 0abc, the vessel only earns profits of 0def. With trans-
ferable quotas, the vessel equates MP3 with the cost of quota for grade 3 only (rb3)
and earns gross profits of 0abc (reduced to abg taking account of the cost of quota).
If, with a non-transferable quota, the discarding condition (13) holds for k
grades in the catch, then for each of these grades we can write:













which, using equation (14), and with some manipulation, gives the general optimal
decision rule for non-transferable quotas:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) =
j=1
k å pjb j
j=1
k å b j
+
j= k+1
n å b j
j=1
k å b j j =1
k
å m jb j. (19)
Condition (19) requires that at the quota limit fish of grades 1,…,k are discarded to-
gether in the same proportions in which they appear in the catch. While the
expression appears rather cumbersome, note that equation (14) is returned in the
special case of one grade of fish discarded (k = 1). The key problem for the vessel
with a non-transferable quota is that the information provided by the quota price is
lacking. If at every point the vessel could perceive the shadow price of quota l, it
would produce according to equation (19). Discarding the least valuable grades se-
quentially, lowest value grade first, which appears rational at the margin once theHatcher 92
quota is filled, may not maximise profits under all conditions. We conclude that in a
fishery with many grades of fish, we cannot be sure that for a given individual quota
allocation discards due to highgrading will be the same under transferable and non-
transferable quotas, even though, all else equal, the optimal level of catch is the
same in each case. It is possible that, under certain conditions, there will be fewer
discards with the non-transferable quota allocation.
Highgrading and Quota Price
We know that with transferable quotas the short-run quota price is set equal to mar-
ginal profit. But although the discarding behaviour of individual vessels is
determined by the quota price, the equilibrium quota price in the fishery is likely to
be affected by the discarding behaviour of the fishery as a whole. We can examine
this as follows. With a transferable quota, following equation (18) we have, in the
case of one grade of fish discarded:
j=2
n




or, adding p1b1 to both sides:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) =
j =2
n
å rb j + p1b1.
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Now, if p1 = r so that:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) =
j =2
n
å rb j + p1b1 = r,
then at the margin the vessel will be indifferent between discarding and not discard-
ing fish of grade 1. Given this, the optimal level of catch must be the same whether
the vessel discards or not. But if vessels discard, their quota demands will fall. If the
quota market is to clear, this implies that the quota price must fall. If the quota price
falls, we will have p1 > r and hence no discarding.
Now, suppose we have p1 < r. With no discarding (assume that all vessel opera-
tors chose voluntarily to refrain from discarding),20 the equilibrium quota price
would be given by:
j=1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q)
qnd
* = rnd , (20)
where  qnd
* (= Qnd
* )  is the optimal catch with no discarding, and rnd is the correspond-
ing quota price. With discarding of all grade 1 fish, we can write:
j=1
n





å rdb j + p1b1, (21)
where rd is the equilibrium quota price with discarding. Since we know that with p1 < r a
vessel is induced to produce where Qd
* < qd
*  (and we know that, if the quota market
clears, Qd
* = Qnd
* ) then given the assumed convexity of the cost function, the LHS of
equation (21) is unambiguously smaller than the LHS of equation (20). However,
this does not necessarily imply that rd < rnd. In fact, rd may be lower than, higher
than, or the same as rnd and still satisfy equations (20) and (21). For a given set of pj
and bj, from equations (20) and (21) we have, with a little manipulation:
rnd - rd = ¢  c (q)
qd
* - ¢  c (q)
q nd
* [ ] - b1 rd - p1 [ ]. (22)
We can see that, for a given quota supply, the difference between the quota price
with and without discarding depends on the parameters of the cost function, as well
as the market value and prevalence in the catch of the lower grade of fish. Note that
without such information we cannot even sign the LHS of equation (22). Although,
intuitively, we might anticipate a lower quota price with discarding, with a relatively
high proportion of fish commanding a relatively low market price, and with rela-
tively high quota prices, it is quite possible that the equilibrium quota price with
discarding is the same or even higher than if there were no discarding.
20 For a discussion of the role of non-monetary influences on compliance with fisheries regulations, see
Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) and Hatcher et al. (2000).Hatcher 94
Conclusions
All else equal and given an efficient allocation of quota among vessels, the incentive
structure underlying decisions to catch and land fish is essentially the same under
transferable and non-transferable quotas. This derives from the equivalence of the
shadow  price  and  the  quota  price,  as  suggested  by Anderson  (1994b)  and
Vestergaard (1996). However, this does not necessarily mean that outcomes will be
the same in all cases. Whereas the information provided by the equilibrium short-
run quota price in a transferable quota fishery is always available to the vessel, the
same is not true of the shadow price of a non-transferable quota. Thus, we saw the
possibility that, under certain conditions, a vessel might highgrade less with a non-
transferable quota, even though it would be optimal to discard to the same extent as
with an identical transferable quota demand. We also saw that the quota price is af-
fected by discarding. In a multispecies transferable quota fishery, discarding of one
species with a relatively constrained quota supply will result in a reduction in the
quota price for the other species. Highgrading, however, has an ambiguous effect on
the quota price. Under certain circumstances, where the total quota supply is rela-
tively small, quota prices are relatively high, and there is a high proportion of
low-value grades in the catch, the quota price with highgrading may be higher than
it would be if vessels did not discard, all else equal.
Where an allocation of non-transferable quotas differs from the efficient alloca-
tion, the shadow price of quota deviates from the quota price, which would be
established if quotas were transferable. Thus, some vessels will face shadow prices
lower than the quota price, while others will face higher shadow prices. While small
deviations may leave overall outcomes unaffected, larger deviations will not. The
more inefficient the allocation, the greater is the likely reduction in discards due to
highgrading under non-transferable quotas compared to transferable quotas. In
multispecies fisheries, however, discards due to a mismatch between quotas and
catches at the vessel level are likely to be increased with an inefficient allocation of
non-transferable quotas.
The overall implications for introducing quota transferability are not clear cut.
While highgrading is a potential problem under both non-transferable and transfer-
able quota systems, the inefficient allocation that a non-transferable quota system is
likely  to  produce will  tend  to  minimise  discards  due  to  highgrading.  In  a
multispecies fishery, on the other hand, a non-transferable quota system will tend to
increase discards due to vessels not holding quota in proportion to the mix of spe-
cies in the catch. Given this, whether discards overall will increase or decrease in a
move from non-transferable to transferable quotas will depend upon the particular
characteristics of the fishery and the existing quota management regime.
The results derived in this paper are conditional upon two important assump-
tions. The first is that enforcement is sufficient to deter landings of over-quota fish,
so that incentives to discard depend only upon the shadow price of non-transferable
quotas or quota prices in a transferable quota fishery. The second key assumption is
that the proportions of different species and grades in the catch are fixed. This disal-
lows both any random variation in the catch composition and, perhaps more
importantly, the possibility that the vessel can selectively target particular species or
grades of fish.21
As Turner (1997) observes, if a vessel has perfect (costless) control over the
harvest technology, and, therefore, catch composition, the problem of discarding be-
comes trivial. In our models, the bi or bj would be costless to alter and would simply
21 Note that these key assumptions are also made, implicitly, in previous studies on discarding.Quota Management in Fisheries 95
be set at profit-maximising levels (which would presumably be zero for those spe-
cies or grades commanding market prices less than the quota or shadow price).
There are two more realistic modeling approaches to admitting some control over
the catch composition that could profitably be pursued. The first is to assume that
changing the harvest technology is a costly investment decision and that, once a de-
cision over the technology is made, the catch composition cannot be altered in the
short run. The second is to allow some degree of control over the catch composition
in the short run, with implications for short-run costs; i.e., the variable costs of ef-
fort. Clearly these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. We could envisage
technology investment decisions which then determine the margins over which con-
trol can be exercised and the implications for variable costs. It would be interesting
then to explore the conditions under which discarding ceases to be profitable; i.e.,
where it is profit maximising to land the catch in its entirety. This issue is left for
further investigation.
The other interesting question deserving further investigation is whether, under
certain circumstances, it might be socially optimal to relax enforcement and allow
some margin of over-quota landings. From the conditions for discarding, it can be
seen that there must be a tradeoff between compliance with quotas at the landing
site and incentives to discard. To the extent that both discarding and landing over-
quota fish impose a social cost, and given that enforcement is costly, there may be a
social optimum that does not require perfect control over landings.22 If the stock ex-
ternalities resulting from excessive catches affect only future outcomes, then by
ignoring these in the short run, over-quota landings and discarding could be socially
optimal given the set TAC. In a dynamic setting, whether or not firms’ private deci-
sions to cheat or to discard are socially optimal will then depend to a large extent on
whether the TAC is set at the right level (assuming the current TAC is costly to in-
crease only in the sense that doing so reduces the future value of the fishery).
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Appendix A
Lagrange functions and first-order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for maximising solu-
tions to the objective functions shown in the text:





å pi biq - di [ ] - c(q) -
i =1
m
å li biq - di - Qi [ ] -
i=1
m










å l ibi £ 0, q ³ 0, Lqq = 0
Ldi = -pi + li - mi £ 0, di ³ 0, Ldidi = 0
Lli = -biq + di + Qi ³ 0, li ³ 0, Llili = 0
Lm i = -di + biq ³ 0, m i ³ 0, Lmimi = 0
(A-1)











å li biq - di - Qi [ ] -
i=1
m










å libi £ 0, q ³ 0, Lqq = 0
Ldi = -pi + li - mi £ 0, di ³ 0, Ldidi = 0
LQi = -ri + l i £ 0, Qi ³ 0, LQiQi = 0
Lli = -biq + di + Qi ³ 0, li ³ 0, Llili = 0
Lm i = -di + biq ³ 0, mi ³ 0, Lmimi = 0
(A-2)





å pj b jq - d j [ ] - c(q) - l
j=1
n
















å pjb j - ¢  c (q) +
j =1
n
å m jb j - l £ 0, q ³ 0, Lqq = 0




å b jq - dj [ ] + Q ³ 0, l ³ 0, Lll = 0
Lm j = -d j + b jq ³ 0, m j ³ 0, Lm jm j = 0
(A-3)Hatcher 98





å pj b jq - d j [ ] - c(q) - rQ - l
j =1
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å pjb j - ¢  c (q) +
j =1
n
å m jb j - l £ 0, q ³ 0, Lqq = 0
Ld j = -p j + l - m j £ 0, dj ³ 0, Ld jdj = 0




å b jq - dj [ ] + Q ³ 0, l ³ 0, Lll = 0
Lm j = -dj + b jq ³ 0, m j ³ 0, Lm jm j = 0
(A-4)
Appendix B
Proof of the equivalence of incentives under a non-transferable quota and an equal
transferable quota demand.
To begin, take equation (14) and write this condition as:
j= 1
n
å pjbj - ¢  c (q) qnt
* = p1 + 1 - b1 [ ] m1, (B-1)
where p1 is the market price of the grade of fish, which it is profitable to discard in
order to increase the catch by one unit while remaining within the quota limit, and
qnt
*  is the optimum level of catch with a non-transferable quota. Recall that m1 is
zero unless the discard constraint is binding, in which case there are no more fish of
this grade left to discard so catch cannot be increased to the point where marginal
profit equals p1. With a transferable quota, following equation (18) we have, in the
case of one grade of fish discarded:
j=2
n




å rb j, (B-2)
where  qt
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which we can compare directly with equation (B-1) and observe that, for a given set
of pj and bj, we have:
j=2
n
å rbj + p 1b 1 = p 1 + 1 - b 1 [ ]m 1 + ¢  c (q) qnt
* - ¢  c (q) qt
* [ ],
which rearranges to:
r = p 1 + m1 +
1
1 - b 1 [ ]
¢  c  (q) qnt
* - ¢  c  (q) q t
* [ ]. (B-4)
If p1 < r, then the RHS of equation (B-4) has a value greater than p1. Given this, m1 = 0
would imply a higher optimal level of catch with a non-transferable quota, given the
assumed convexity of the cost function, but if m1 > 0 the optimal level of catch with
a non-transferable quota could be higher, lower, or the same as the optimal level of
catch with a transferable quota. However, if we have a non-transferable quota allo-
cation that is exactly the same as the efficient quota allocation, Q*;  i.e., the
equilibrium transferable quota demand, we would expect the optimal level of catch
to be the same in each case; i.e.,  qnt
* = qt
* (given Q*, if profits are maximised with a
constant quota cost, r, for every unit of fish landed, they should also be maximised
under equivalent conditions, but where that cost is not incurred). If the optimal level
of catch is the same, equation (B-4) collapses to:
r = p 1 + m1, (B-5)
with m1 > 0. Thus, given the same quota allocation, all low-value fish are discarded
in each case, and the volume of discards will equal q* – Q*, where q* = Q*/ j=2
n å b j . If
this were not true, then with the non-transferable quota we would either have: not all
fish of the low-value grade discarded at  qnt
* = qt
*, in which case we must have
1 = 0 , which from equation (B-4) requires  qnt
* > qt
*, or all fish of the low-value
grade discarded at  qnt
* < qt
* , which cannot be the case given Q* and b1. Thus, we can
affirm that if from equation (13) we have p1 + m1 = l and from equation (16) r = l,
then the shadow price of the non-transferable quota is equal to the transferable quota
price.